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Abstract 
We analyze the effect of statistical capacity on government 
effectiveness/efficiency  using  cross-sectional and panel data from a sample of 48 
African countries for the period 2003-2008. The results show that statistical 
capacity positively affects government effectiveness/efficiency. The positive 
effect of statistical capacity is robust after controlling for other determinants of 
institutional quality and usage of alternative estimation techniques. It follows that 
countries with higher statistical capacity levels enjoy institutions of better quality 
than countries with low levels of statistical capacity. As a policy implication, if 
Africa does not have effective governments, it is partly because it has a very weak 
statistical capacity. In such an environment, access to information for effective 
governance is compromised. 
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1 Introduction 
The Young (2010) findings have had an important influence on policy debates in both 
academic and media circles.  The main result of the author is that Africa could be 
growing three times more than what official data reveal. Sala-i-Martin and Pinkovskiy 
(2010) are among those who have sided with this growth tendency. So there could be 
an underestimation of the African reality. An underestimation which is challenged by 
the study of Harttgen et al. (2010) which has concluded that there is no African 
miracle escaping our attention. Accordingly, per capita income and standard measures 
of African consumption do not underestimate anything. On the other hand, a series of 
country-specific articles by Jerven  suggest that some African success stories are 
exaggerated (Jerven, 2010b). Cases in point are Tanzania (Jerven, 2011a), Botswana 
(Jerven, 2010c), Kenya (Jerven, 2011b) and Ghana (Jerven, 2011e). Hence, the author 
recommends more caution (Jerven, 2010a, 2011c, and 2011d). Within the framework 
of Jerven, there is an exaggeration of the African reality. 
All the same, the truth is imperative: African data reflect significant inadequacies. The 
literature has consistently recommended improvements of data (e.g. Sahn and Stifel, 
2003, Stifel and Christiaensen 2007, Johnson et al., 2009, Deaton and Heston, 2010, 
Henderson et al., 2012) and statistics (e.g. An Instrumental Variables Approach, 
GMM) to correct  statistical bias
1
. However, other direct implications of data quality 
have not been taken into account. For instance, what is the consequence of the capacity 
of a State to first collect statistics instead of simply observing them? African statistics 
on economic growth are widely known to be inaccurate
2
. However, the extent and 
nature of these inadequacies and their implications for data users have not been 
rigorously studied (Jerven, 2011a). Very few studies (e.g. Blades, 1975; 1980; works 
of Jerven) are concerned with the quality of African data. 
The innovation of this study is precisely its willingness to assess the above concern. It 
focuses more on the relationship between the statistical capacity of a State and its 
performance in terms of efficiency. We postulate that, states with information and 
                                                             
1 This issue has been substantially documented in African institutional literature where good governance 
indicators maybe subject of bias owing to media propaganda (Asongu, 2012ab, 2013ab).  
2 Ghana is an eloquent case in point (Jerven and Ebo Duncan, 2012). 
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statistics should be better-off than their counterparts who either do not have or have 
data of poor quality. Our hypothesis is verified on a sample of sub-Saharan African 
(SSA) countries.  
The paper is organized in seven sections, including this introduction. In the second 
section, we propose a simple model to demonstrate the hypothetical relation. Next, we 
discuss the hypothesis of the African statistical tragedy. This hypothesis is justified by 
our positioning of the paper on SSA countries. The empirical model and data are 
discussed and presented respectively in Section 4. Section 5 underlines a graphical 
analysis as well as the results of simple regressions between government effectiveness 
and statistical capacity.  The empirical results are presented and discussed in Section 6. 
We conclude with Section 7.  
2 A Simple Model 
Let us consider the following wellbeing social function of the type  
where the subscript 1 to  n represent individuals and households making-up a society. 
For more subtlety and simplicity, we define   and 
  as the desired optimal situation. A government is said 
to be effective or efficient if   , where the t subscript is an 
index of time. Accordingly, the government becomes effective or increases its 
effectiveness at time t if Min  . For this purpose, it has to use   
   where X represents the instruments at its disposal. From a formal 
standpoint, if , then the following can be written  as 
  It follows that the effectiveness of government is 
contingent on its instruments. We assume that our aggregate wellbeing function 
depends on available information, denoted I.  
If   
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- , the government has information on the actual state or the optimal state 
of the country.  
- , the government has no information on the state of the country.  
- , the government has part of the information.  
By virtue of the Tinbergen rule, I=1 is the ideal situation since, , 
 and . We can deduce a simple stylized fact: a 
government is particularly effective when it has the information enabling it to confront 
the social reality of the country and when the instruments are feasible. Hence, the 
ability to acquire the information becomes a determining factor for the effectiveness of 
government. This is not a simple case of information asymmetry. Consistent with 
Lucas (1976) or Keyland and Prescott (1977), our postulation goes beyond simple 
economic policy.  
3 Hypothesis of Africa's statistical tragedy 
Accordingly, Africa’s statistical tragedy3 is neither a mere illusion nor a simple 
perspective. We offer some evidence to support this thesis. 
Figure 1 illustrates two periods of statistical capacity in four regions of the world. In 
all cases, the African region is one that is misplaced. In 1999, she had the score of 50 
out of 100. More than a decade later, the region gained only 9.15 points, America 
gained 13.57 (from 63.39 to 76.96), Europe edged by 17.46 (53.64 to 71.09) and Asia 
also improved 16.56 (63.92 to 80.49). Europe, for example which was in the same 
situation as Africa has widened the gap with 8 points.  
In addition, in 1999, 25% in the lowest percentile (including countries with scores 
ranging from 10 to 17) entailed three African countries (Somalia, Liberia and Libya) 
and none in the 75% percentile of the higher (countries with scores ranging from 79 to 
86). In 2011, 25% of the lowest percentiles (countries with scores ranging from 22 to 
                                                             
3 We borrow this concept from Shanta Devarajan (http://blogs.worldbank.org/africacan/africa-s-statistical-
tragedy. Accessed on the 10th of August 2012) 
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36) included Eritrea, Libya and Somalia; and no African country still features in the 
75% highest percentile (countries with scores ranging from 93 to 94). 
Figure 1. Evolution of statistical capacity in continents 
 
Source: Author, based on data of Bulletin Board on Statistical Capacity  
This figure 1 does not include one very developed country, as can be seen in the 
following chart. Countries covered by the white color are generally not covered by this 
index. 
Figure 2. Mapping of countries concerned 
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Source: Encyclopedia of the Nations, available at http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/WorldStats/Bulletin-
Board-Stats-Overall-Score.html (accessed: 10th of August 2012) 
Figure 3 below is constructed with the averages of every country within each region. 
We notice that (more or less) with the exception of Africa, there is a decreasing 
general tendency. When the whole of Africa is further considered, it is clear that this 
decreasing tendency is not due to crises. Another interesting characteristic arising at 
this level is that on average SSA countries and other sub-regions have a score of below 
60.  
Figure 3. Evolution trends of African sub-regions 
 
After this cross-regional analysis, it is worthwhile to analyze the situation in detail. 
Between 2000
4 
and 2010, two African countries experienced the highest rating 
downgrade: Côte d'Ivoire (-25 points) and Zimbabwe (-21 points). After this class, 
there is another. In it, we rank Botswana (-15), Burkina Faso (-12) and Guinea (-10 
points). In the list of countries that have made significant progress are Sierra Leone 
(25) and Liberia (23). Then there are those who have jumped by 10 points: Cameroon 
(17 points), Ethiopia (16 points), Nigeria (15 points), Congo (15 points), Libya (13 
points), Ghana (13 points) and Sudan (12 points). 
                                                             
4 In the official data, the indicator is not available for the period 2000-2002. We have used estimations from the 
Foundation Ibrahim for these years. 
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For the period 2000-2010: only two African countries (South Africa and Egypt) have 
an average score around the horizon of 80; five (Côte d'Ivoire, Senegal, Mauritius, 
Morocco, Ethiopia) have an average score in the neighborhood of 70; thirteen 
(Botswana, Burkina Faso, Gambia, Lesotho, Mali, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia) have a rating of less than 60, fifteen 
(Zambia, Togo, Seychelles, Rwanda, Namibia, Nigeria, Niger , Mauritania, Kenya, 
Ghana, Chad, Comoros, Cameroon, Benin) have an average score around 50; six 
(Central African Republic, Congo, Djibouti, Gabon, Sao Tome, Sierra Leone) have an 
average score in the region of 40; five (Libya, Guinea-Bissau, Equatorial Guinea, 
Eritrea, DRC) have an average score in the horizon of 30 and, two (Liberia, Somalia) 
have an average score around the threshold of 20. 
Assuming that the mean is not a robust parameter, we notice a fairly significant change 
in the classifications. To do this, we consider only the ratings of 2011. Two countries 
(Egypt and South Africa) have ratings in the horizon of  80, nine (Ethiopia, Malawi, 
Mauritius, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda) were swimming 
around 70, thirteen (Algeria, Burkina Faso Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, 
Lesotho, Madagascar, Mali, Rwanda, Senegal, Swaziland, Zambia) in the 
neighborhood of 60; twelve (Benin, Botswana, Burundi, Central African Republic, 
Chad, Congo, Kenya Guinea, Togo, Mauritania, Namibia, Sierra Leone) around the 
threshold of 50, five around the 40 rating (Angola, DRC, Gabon, Guinea-Buiseau, 
Sudan, Zimbabwe), three (Eritrea, Liberia, Libya) in the region of 30 and only Somalia 
with a rating around the height of 20. 
4 Estimation Strategy and Data 
We estimate a plethora of models and specifications. Our first approach is to regress a 
model that incorporates several variables. The model is the following: 
                            (1) 
where GE is government effectiveness/efficiency. Data on government 
effectiveness/efficiency sources from the dataset compiled by Daniel Kaufmann, Art 
Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi at the World Bank.  The indicator is based on 30 
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underlying data sources reporting the perceptions of governance of a large number of 
survey respondents and expert assessments worldwide. Government 
effectiveness/efficiency is distributed between −2.5 and 2.5 (best). X = ( ; …;  ) is 
the vector of control variables, and is the error term.  is a vector of the following 
variables: education, log of GDP per capita and log of trade. The data on GDP per 
capita and trade are from Pen World Tables. Education (Tertiary Enrolment) is 
obtained from the World Development Indicators of the World Bank (2010). 
Statistical Capacity is our variable of interest and our parameter of interest is thus . 
This indicator of the Bulletin Board on Statistical Capacity (BBSC), developed by the 
Development Data Group (DECDG) of The World Bank, aims to improve measuring 
and monitoring of statistical capacity of IDA countries in close collaboration with 
countries and users. The database contains information on various aspects of national 
statistical systems and includes a country-level statistical capacity indicator based on a 
set of criteria consistent with international recommendations.  
The BBSC provides information on various aspects of national statistical systems of 
developing countries, including a country-level statistical capacity indicator. This 
indicator assesses the capacity of statistical systems using a diagnostic framework 
which consists of three assessment areas: methodology; data sources; and periodicity 
and timeliness (institutional framework is not included). With a rating ranging from 0-
100, higher values denote better capacity.  
Eq. (1) is first estimated in cross-section, using averages of the period 2003-2009. 
Next, we estimate using panel data for this same period. 
Accordingly, institutions can create an environment that improves Statistical Capacity. 
Some factors for this include: an excellent education, competent human resources and 
adequate financial resources. Hence, the estimation approach should take the feedback 
effect (from institutions to statistical capacity) into account.  
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In order to account for the issue of endogeneity, we estimate Eq. (2) below:  
 
 
 
Table 1 below provides a summary statistics for the variables used in our analysis. We 
notice that the variable of interest is on average negative for this part of Africa. While 
Somalia has the lowest rating, the Mauritius Island has the highest.  
Table 1. Summary statistics (2003-2008 averages) 
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Statistical Capacity 48 54.170 13.365 22 84 
Statistical Capacity 1999 42 49.087 14.751 14.444 72.222 
Log GDP per capita 48 7.207 1.046 5.171 9.983 
Log Open 48 4.180 0.702 0.627 5.203 
Education 45 5.049 4.342 0.468 21.182 
Government effectiveness 48 -0.778 0.6102 -2.2423 .6735 
 
These regressors are available for the following countries: Angola, Benin, Botswana, 
Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic (CAR), 
Chad, Comoros, Congo Democratic Republic (CDR), Congo Republic, Côte d'Ivoire,  
Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, 
Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, 
South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
 
 
 
 
 
(2) 
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5 A graphical Analysis 
Figure 4. Linear relationship between government effectiveness and statistical capacity 
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Figure 4 portray the relationship between each of the measures of institutional quality 
(y-axis) and Statistical Capacity (x-axis) for the countries included in our sample 
(average data from 2003-2008) of 48 countries. In Figure 4, government 
effectiveness/efficiency is plotted against Statistical Capacity. It follows that countries 
with higher Statistical Capacity enjoy higher government effectiveness. We also 
represent the fitted line for the simple regression model 
where GE is government efficiency. The 
estimated coefficient for  is positive (+0.032) and strongly significant (p-value = 
0.000), indicating that high Statistical Capacity improve government 
efficiency/effectiveness. 
If the conclusion of the above exploratory analysis confirms the intuition developed in 
the section 2, it worthwhile to test its solidity with an empirical assessment. This is the 
objective of the following section.  
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6 Estimation results 
We present the regression results in three tables. Table 2 reports the results of Eq. (1). 
In the first table, we present the basics results of our estimations, using the cross-
sectional averages for the 2003 to 2008.  We notice from Columns 1-3 that our 
coefficient of interest , is positive and significant at the 1% level in the regressions. 
This coefficient is strongly significant. In the case of fourth column (4), its reliability 
level falls slightly but the variable remains significant. In columns (3) and (4), we have 
used a variable of interest lagged by the index of 1999. It is a way for us to test the 
robustness of our results. We comment on the control variable later. 
In the same direction, columns (2) and (4) present estimations with Clusters. We thus 
find that the positive effect of Statistical Capacity remains significant after accounting 
for other determinants of institutional quality. This finding suggests that countries with 
higher Statistical Capacity enjoy better Government effectiveness. 
Table 2. Main Regression (Cross-sectional) 
 Government effectiveness 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Statistical Capacity .027*** 
(.003) 
.027***  
(.005) 
  
Statistical Capacity 1999   .020*** 
(.004) 
.020** 
(0.008) 
Log GDP per capita .186*** 
(.068) 
.186*  
(.071) 
.304*** 
(.065) 
.304*** 
(.060) 
Log Open -.100 
(.118) 
-.100   
(.083) 
-.161 
(.127) 
-.161*   
(.069) 
Education .032*** 
(.009) 
.031** 
(.010) 
.0309*** 
(.0110) 
.0309*   
(.014) 
Constant  -3.333*** 
(.574) 
-3.334***   
(.512) 
-3.354***   
(.587) 
-3.354***   
(.628) 
Clusters No Yes No Yes 
Observations 45 45 41 41 
R² 0.64 0.64 0.62 0,62 
Robust p-values in parentheses    
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.1 
With the exception of the openness indicator (that has the unexpected sign), other 
determinants included in these regressions as control variables have the expected signs 
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and are statistically significant.  The results are broadly consistent with those of  
Kanyama-Kalonda and Kodila-Tedika (2012).  
We also employ a panel data analysis in order to account for more specifics.  From the 
resulting findings presented in Table 3 below, we notice that the variable of interest is 
highly significant in statistical terms. Hence, Statisitcal capactity has a positive nexus 
with government effectiveness. We also notice that (with respect to results in the 
preceding table) GDP per capita loses its significance while openness loses both its 
blur significance and sign. While the constant term significantly remains negative, 
education negatively affects government effectiveness.  
Table 3. Main Regression (with Panel data) 
 Government effectiveness 
Variables Fixed-effects regression                
Statistical Capacity   .007***    
(.002) 
Log GDP per capita .136    
(.084) 
Log Open .101 
 (.060)  
Education -.017*    
(.010) 
Constant  -2.326*** 
(.854) 
Observations 269 
R²between 0.34 
R²overall 0.32 
R² within 0.08 
Prob>F 0.001 
Prob> F 0.000 
Robust p-values in parentheses    
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.1 
The model in Eq. (2) is estimated by Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR), to 
account for possible endogeneity that result from the inclusion of government 
effectiveness in Table 4. This table compares panel-based and cross-sectional results. 
Simultaneity bias is corrected with the method of Zellner. Even after correcting for this 
bias, the result is robust.  The statistical capacity of a nation remains a highly 
significant determinant, after consideration of the other determinants susceptible of 
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influencing the quality of government efficiency in a nation. By comparing the GDP 
per capita variable across regressions, we find some contradiction in the results which 
could be an interesting future research direction. While the openness measure is not 
significant in both regressions, education consistently has a positive nexus with 
government effectiveness. Note should be taken of the fact that the above discussion is 
relevant only to the upper part of Table 4.  
Table 4. Main Regression (with Cross-Sectional and Panel data SUR) 
 
 Cross-sectional Panel data 
Regressors Dependant variable: Government effectiveness 
Statistical Capacity .037*** 
(.003) 
.0354*** 
(.001) 
Log GDP per capita .160*** 
(.060) 
-.034*** 
(.039) 
Log Open -.034 
(.089) 
-.034 
(.039) 
Education .030** 
(.013) 
.028*** 
(.006) 
Constant  -3.930 *** 
(.510) 
-3.863*** 
(.226) 
R² 0.60 0.53 
 Dependant variable: Statistical Capacity 
Government 
effectiveness 
24.293*** 
(2.200) 
24.078*** 
(.981) 
Log GDP per capita -3.581** 
(1.589) 
-3.495*** 
(.717) 
Education -.710** 
(.348) 
-.661*** 
(.154) 
Constant  102.776*** 
(11.654) 
101.811*** 
(5.252) 
R² 0.46 0.40 
Robust p-values in parentheses    
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.1 
7 Conclusion 
This paper has mainly been concerned with the effect of national statistical capacity on 
institutional quality using African data. The main finding is that statistical capacity 
positively affects each of the measures of the quality of government that we have 
considered. Therefore, countries with higher statistical capacity enjoy better 
government institutions, particularly government effectiveness. 
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These results are robust to alternative econometric approaches. We have used several 
econometric methods to validate the conclusion of this study. As a policy implication, 
if Africa does not have effective governments, it is partly because it has a very weak 
statistical capacity. In such an environment, access to information for effective 
governance is compromised. It is indeed a statistical tragedy. 
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